2. EFFINGHAM was operating under the orders of the Rear Admiral
Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron and was on passage to Bodo with the South Wales
Borderers, Headquarters 24th(?) Infantry Brigade and 167th(t) Field Ambulance together
with 10 Bren Carriers and some 150 tons of stores and ammunition.
3. At l915 the Rear Admiral Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron had
directed EFFINGHAM to lead COVENTRY and CAIRO
through Briksvaer Channel bein'pregeded by MATABELE and ECHO (see R.A.20th Cruiser
Squadron's 1555/17).
EFFINGHAM had ordered MATABELE to take station ahead of her
4 cables, and ECHO 1 1/2 cables on the starboard beam of MATABELE (see
EFFINGHAM's 1721/17 ) .
4. EFFINGHAM had been ordered to be guide of the Fleet.
5. The passage of the Briksvaer Channel, as opposed to the normal
approach to Bødo, had been suggested by me, and concurred in by the Rear Admiral
Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron (see signal "A") since it was considered
that there would be less likelihood of enemy subnarinee being encountered there
than in the normal passage.
6. The Briksvaer Channel is admittedly more foul of navigational dangers
than the normal approach and it is noted that on page 204 of Norway Pilot, part III, lines
21 et seq., it is remarked that vessels with local knowledge can make this passage - (it
may here be interpolated that this qualiflcation concerning "local knowledge"
appears to be general in Norwegian waters except with regard to main ship
channels,and, hitherto, experience had shown that no extreme regard need be paid to it, provided normal
pilotage precautions were observed).
7. Whilst admittedly EFFINGHAM had no previous experience
of this route, I did have in my possession a large scale Norwegian chart, number 65,on
which the navigational features are clearly marked in a much clearer manner and on a
larger scale than Admiralty Chart No.2311.
On that basis, I considered that the navigation of Brikswaer Channel was
perfectly practicable and recommended its use to the Rear Admiral
accordingly.
The Earl of Cork and
Orrey G.C.B.,G.C.V.O.
Flag Officer
Commanding.
Page 2
8. At 192S ships position was fixed
as 67° 15.2' `North 13° 37` East,course O4O°. The gyros had previously been checked by
transits.
EFFINGHAM was
proceeding at 290 revs having reduced from 300 revs (22 knots) consequent on a signall
from Rear Admiral Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron to the effect that A.A. cruisers were
finding the speed excessive.(During the passage from Harstad 10 revs had been used for
keeping station as the speed ordered (22 knots)).
9. At about 1926 EFFINGHAM as guide of the
Fleet hoisted the signal "my course 080°- destroyers take up appointed
station".
10. At that time COVENTRY
was some 6 to 7 cables!astern, with CAIR0 astæ n of her.
MATABELE and ECH0 were some 5 cabloe on EFFINGkAM's starboard bow.
11. At about 1927 (Svartskj Island not yet
clearly defined), EFFINGHAM hauled down the signal and altered cours to 080° to bring the
north shore of Briksvaer Island on that bearing.
12. At about 1935,as soon as Svartskj Island was
clearly defined), course was altered by signal 10 degrees to port together to bring that
island on the correct bearing 080°, and shortly after, course was again
altered, 10
degrees to starboard together, when steadied again on 080°, the north end of Svartsk
Island bore 080°.
13. At thls time MATABELE was slightly to port
of EFFINGHAM's line of advance and was ordered to get ahead which she did beforore
grounding. ECHO who had been too far to starboard, had been ordered not to exceed 11/2
cables from MATABELE (see EFFINGHAM's 1935/17).
14. At about 1944 signal "alter course in
succession097°" was hoisted.
15. When MATABELE was ahead of EFFINGHAM,
EFFINGHAM hauled down the Guide Pendant.
This procedure, though perhaps somewhat
unorthodox was adopted with the intention that when the alter course signal was hauled
down, MATABELE should alter to the signalled course and remain steady on it, and not
necessarily keep station on EFFINGHAM till EFFINGHAM was correctly on her course
whereafter the guide pendant could have been rehoisted.
Although this procedure may have cause some
doubt to MATABELE it coould have and did have no effect on her subsequent grounding and is
therefore not material to the issue.
16. As was intended MATABELE altered course to
097° when EFFINGAM hauled down the alter course signal - the right centre of Sjurshl
Island then bearing 097° from EFFINGHAM, the East shore of Stangeroy island abeam to
starboard.
17. Very shortly after altering to
097°, MATABELE was observed to alter suddenly to starboard and to reduce speed.
EFFINGHAM was
at that moment about to alter to 097 but on seeing MATABELE swing to
starboard, starboard
wheel was ordered with a view to sheering off and leaving MATABELE on EFFINGHAM`s port
hand.
18. At 1948 1/2 EFFINGHAM grounded heavily and swung sharply
to port. I immediately blew a long blast on the syren to warn ships
following.
19. The ship appeared to have hit first between
10-19 bulkhead, probably on the port bow, and then in a series of heavy bumps along the
fore and aft line, the second bump being abaft 62 bulkhead,
20. The ship`s position was fixed at the earliest possible moment~- 1950 - as follows :
1 ½ cables south east of Faksen Shoal - ship's head 046° - speed about ten
knots.
21. After grounding EFFINGHAM commenced to settle slowly on an even
keel, but the
engines had stopped and both boiler rooms and engine rooms commenced to fill rapidly
,flooding subsequently spreading to compartments forward and aft of these
compartmnets.
For a time, until steam was no longer available,EFFINGHAM had steering power and
starboard wheel was ordered. Electric power failed shortly after grounding as steam supply
ceased.
22. Immediate steps were taken to close all water
tight doors and to shore up bulkheadse. The latter was effective enough to support the
bulkheads temporarily but it was clear that the bottom was ripped open for much of the
ship's length and water was entering in many places at a speed wihich could not be
controlled.
23. Nevertheless, the ship remained on an even keel settling slowly for
a considerable time, although from reports I received I anticipated that at any moment the
bulkheads would give and the ship heel over.
Having some 1020 troops on board, as well as the ship's company I
was concerned to beach the ship with a view to saving as much life as
possible.
24. At about 2015 ECH0 was ordered alongside to transfer the troops and
at the same time instructed to tow me towards shelving water northeast of Briksvaer
Island.
Very little way was made but sufficient to carry EFFINGHAM on some
distance before ECH0 had completed embarking the troops and some 250 - 300-of the ship's
company, and had cast off her wires. (about 2045).
25. About this time Rear Admiral Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron
directed me to sink the ship in deep water, if possible, but with no stern pover available
and with slight headway and slight windage the ship, still on an even
keel, gradually
drifted broadside on to position north of Skjoldshl Island where she eventually grounded
in some five fathoms.
26. Demolition charges which had been organised for such occasions could
not be implemented since the detonators were in a submerged compartment. The same applied
to depth charges stowed in torpedo flat, but primers removed to a compartment already
submerged.
It was impossible to open the Kingston`s or main circulator inlet since
they were submerged, whilst the bilge suctions could not be opened as the spindles had
been bent by the damage.
The opening of water tight hatches under pressure would
have been hazardous to the life of personnel engaged on that work.
27-
I much regret that preoccupations with these matters and the saving of
life, I overlooked
the possibility of letting go the anchors. The ship was then in some 55
fathoms: that I
could have let the sheet anchor go is true (the effectiveness of doing so is
doubtful) -
the letting go of the bower anchor would, in the absence of steam to turn the
spindle,
have been a prolonged operation involving the removal of the clutches between decks by
driving them out by heavy mauls.
28, Meanwhile MATABELE`s boats as well as
ECHO's and some of EFFINGHAM`s transferred small numbers of the ship's company to
METABELE.
29. Whilst ECHO was taking the first load of
survivors to COVENTRY I got out all available boats and carly
floats by hand and cleared away loose timber etc., for use as rafts.
During
this perilod five steel chests of S.P.s and C.B.s together with signal and W/T books were
transferred to ECHO. Key memoranda were burned with some other C.B.s Cypher
logs, signal
logs and all filed copies of messages were either burned or transferred to
ECHO.
As far as is
known the only C.B.s remaining on board were intelligence reports and various manuals in
steel cupboards in No, 3 magazine lobby which were submerged at an early
period.
Fleet folios
were also transrerred to ECHO. In addition V.C./V.F. was completely wrecked and dismantled
and the vital parts transferred to ECHO. The H/F D/F set was wrecked and vital parts
removed.
30. ECHO subsequently returned and came alongside
when EFFINGHAM had grounded and took off the rest of the ship's company as well as certain
army equipment. (about 2210).
31. I embarked in ECHO who proceeded to COVENTRY where I reported the situation to Rear Admiral Commanding
20th Cruiser Squadron and transferred further survivors to COVENTRY. Rear Admiral
Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron instructed me to proceed in ECHO to CAIRO to transfer
further survivors, and then to return to EFFINGHAM with a working party to clear army
equipment into trawlers and puffers which CAIRO had meanwhile
ordered out from Bodo. I was also ordered to try and tow EFFINGHAM to deep water to sink
her if this was possible wilth the craft from Bodo.
I informed
Rear Admiral Commanding 20th Cruiser Squadron that I thought this impossible and that the
ship was firmly aground.
32. On my retum to EFFINGHAM
about 0010/18th May there were some dozen puffers and two or three steamers alongside with
three British army officerss. All army equipment and the stores other than the ten
carriers, with the exception of a small amount of barbed wire sand bags and packs were
transferred to the puffers and sent to B odo. Two Bren Carriers were hoisted into a
steamer and sent to Bodo.
As many gun
sight tele6copes and binoculaes as possible, toghther with the great majority of ships
rifles werse taken away.
When this had
been done the sh ip was abandoned. She was firmly aground by the bows and continuing to
make water; the stern was however now lightened to aproximately normal
draught.
Unsuccessful
efforts were made by the two large steamers to tow her off.
I did not consider it prudent to risk ECHO in attempting to tow her especially as a
Heinkel (later engaged by 3 Skuas) was sighted about this time.
33. Having done everything that seemed
possible and it was desirable for ECHO not to remain in the vicinity, she sailed for
Harstad. (at 0345).
34. I decided not to leave a
party on board EFFINGHAM since they would be out of communication with the world, subject
to air attack, and the problem of feeding them would be difficult.
35. Subsequently on passage to
Haratad I appreciated that although the ship could not be sailed, enemy flying boats or
submarines could send parties on board, and the guns had not been rendered
unserviceable.
36. I therefore decided to risk
air attack and ordered ECHO to return to the vicinity of EFFINGHAM and at 0700 a party was
again sent on board and practically all ready use ammunition was thrown over the side and
all possible action taken to render n the guns useless either by removing locks or
strikers or putting sand in working parts eto.
37. During
ECHO's absence a steamer had embarked a furthe r two Bren Carriers for
Bodo, but without
fully equipped salwage plant and derricks it was considered impracticable to lift out the
remainder. The tide had risen and the ship was now much lower in the water and even more
firmly aground than berore with only 3-4 feet of freeboard.
There was no likelihod of her being towed off, and so I decided to endeavour to assist her
disintegration by firing a torpedo aimed at the region of her mainmast to break her back.
Although only in some five fathoms of water I felt this action was desirabe and might
assist in turning her on her side.
Accordingly, one torpedo was fired and she at once commenced to list to starboard and sink
further. When last seen the starboard side of her quarter deck was awash.
38. It being undesirable to
risk ECHO by remaining in the vicinity without air protection I then ordered ECHO to sail
for Harstad.(about 0900).
39. In connection with this
lamentable occurence I desire to bring to your notioe the efficient and seamanlike manner
in which Commander Spurgeon D.S.O., R.A.N. H.M.S. ECHO handled his ship and enabled all
surrivors to be taken off.
I
also wish to comment most favourably on the excellent behaviour of the troops in
circumstances unusual and alarming for them and I would particularly like to brilng to
your notice the exemplory conduct of the officers and ship' company in very trying
conditions.
I hope
to bring to your notice in due course the names of a limited number of those particularly
worthy of mention.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
